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mere statement that commitment counsel must assume a more
active, adversary role does not guarantee that future proceed-
ings will be free of constitutional infirmities. Whether those
committed in the future are afforded due process of law re-
mains a question which will have to be determined on a case
by case basis.
THOMAs J. NICHOLS
Constitutional Law-Eighth Amendment-Physical Pun-
ishment In Public Schools-In Ingraham v. Wright,1 the
United States Supreme Court refused to extend the eighth
amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment 2
to Dade County, Florida school children who were severely
beaten by their principal and other school officials. Addition-
ally, while finding that the pupils had a liberty interest in
personal security worthy of protection under the fourteenth
amendment,3 the Court ruled that the Dade County system of
corporal punishment was not itself violative of due process, in
view of the common law safeguards and state tort remedies
available in cases of abuse.
Ingraham was a class action brought for injunctive and dec-
laratory relief and damages by students in Drew Junior High
School on behalf of all students similarly situated in the Dade
County, Florida school system. The plaintiffs alleged that res-
pondent school officials inflicted severe and continuing corpo-
ral punishment upon students in Drew Junior High in violation
of the constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual
punishment and deprivation of liberty without due process.
The trial court dismissed the action without the presenta-
1. 97 S. Ct. 1401 (1977).
2. The eight amendment states, "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend.
VII.
3. In part, the fourteenth amendment states,
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
19771
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
tion of any evidence by defendants, finding no constitutional
basis for relief on either the eighth or the fourteenth amend-
ment questions.4 A panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed, finding that the severity of the punishments inflicted
were such that the eighth amendment could be invoked, and
that plaintiffs had been deprived of liberty without due pro-
cess.5 En banc, upon rehearing, the panel decision was vacated
and the district court dismissal reinstated.' The United States
Supreme Court affirmed.
The facts in Ingraham presented a clear basis upon which
the Court could decide the eighth amendment question. Plain-
tiffs and many other students at Drew Junior High were beaten
severely and systematically over a long period of time, in clear
contravention of the applicable Florida statute:
Each teacher or other member of the staff of any school shall
assume such authority for the control of pupils as may be
assigned to him by the principal and shall keep good order
in the classroom and in other places in which he is assigned
to be in charge of pupils, but he shall not inflict corporal
punishment before consulting the principal or teacher in
charge of the school, and in no case shall such punishment
be degrading or unduly severe in its nature. Under no circum-
stances may a teacher (except of a one-teacher school) sus-
pend a pupil from school or class.'
4. Ingraham v. Wright, No. 71-23 (S.D. Fla. 1973).
5. 498 F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1974).
6. 525 F.2d 909 (5th Cir. 1976).
7. 97 S. Ct. 1401 (1977).
8. Fla. Stat. § 232.27 (1975). As revised in 1976, § 232.27 provides,
Subject to law and to the rules of the district school board, each teacher or other
member of the staff of any school shall have such authority for the control and
discipline of students as may be assigned to him by the principal or his desig-
nated representative and shall keep good order in the classroom and in other
places in which he is assigned to be in charge of students. If a teacher feels that
corporal punishment is necessary, at least the following procedures shall be
followed:
(1) The use of corporal punishment shall be approved in principle by the
principal before it is used, but approval is not necessary for each specific in-
stance in which it is used.
(2) A teacher or principal may administer corporal punishment only in the
presence of another adult who is informed beforehand, and in the student's
presence, of the reason for the punishment.
(3) A teacher or principal who has administered punishment shall, upon
request, provide the pupil's parent or guardian with a written explanation of the
reason for the punishment and the name of the other [adult] who was present.
[Vol. 61:199
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On three occasions, twice when boys were accused of
"playing hooky" and once when plaintiff Bloom was accused
of making an obscene phone call,' fifty "licks" with a long
wooden mallet were administered by two assistants to the prin-
cipal.10 In one instance, Daniel Lee was forced to join a line of
students who were required to bend over the back of a chair
with their hands on the front of the seat (the favored position
for such paddlings). When Daniel asked what he had done to
deserve punishment, Mr. Barnes hit him on the hand with a
mallet four or five times. A bone in Daniel's right hand was
fractured, which prompted the district court judge to state
"[i]t seems to me to be disfigured, a portion of his right knuc-
kle is enlarged to some degree."'
With this factual basis, Justice Powell, writing for the five
member majority 2 engaged in a wide-ranging discussion of the
history of corporal punishment in common law. He pointed out
that corporal punishment had its beginnings with the doctrine
of in loco parentis, first espoused in the 18th century, and
enshrined by Blackstone in his Commentaries.'3 The doctrine
was developed to cover situations in which private tutors, hired
and paid by parents to instruct their children, felt it necessary
to use corporal punishment in dealing with their charges. The
tutors were permitted to stand in the lawful place of the par-
ents while disciplining their students.'4
With compulsory attendance rules in effect throughout the
United States," in loco parentis has been modified or aban-
doned altogether in favor of the parens patriae doctrine." Thus,
9. Another student later admitted making the call. 498 F.2d at 258.
10. Id. In each case, the boys' buttocks and legs were black and blue and swollen;
Reginald Bloom required medical attention.
11. Id. This and other severe punishments are detailed at length in Brief for Peti-
tioners at 8-17.
12. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Blackmun and Rehnquist joined
Justice Powell in his opinion. A dissent was filed by Justice White and joined in by
Justices Brennan, Marshall and Stevens. Justice Stevens also filed a separate dissent.
13. 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES* 453.
14. See A. RErrMAN, J. FOLLMANN & E. LADD, CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN THE PUBLIC
SCHOOLS (ACLU Reports, 1972); 6 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 583 (1970-71).
15. See,. e.g., Wis. STAT. § 118.15 (1975).
16. The term refers to "the state, as a sovereign - referring to the sovereign power
of guardianship over persons under disability;. . . such as minors. . . ... BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1269 (Rev. 4th ed. 1968) (citations omitted). A discussion of the deficien-
cies of the judicial system as used against minors can be found in Brief for Appellants
at 13-18. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). See also A. REIrMAN, J. FULLMAN, E. LADD,
CORPORAL PUNISHMENT IN THE PUBLC SCHOOLS (ACLU Report, 1972).
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with the Supreme Court's summary approval, 7 corporal pun-
ishment is now sanctioned in most states notwithstanding the
parents' disapproval or contrary direction.'8 This background
led the majority to conclude that traditional common law rem-
edies and restraints, coupled with the openness of the schools
and the freedom of students to leave school at will, 9 made it
unnecessary for the Court to extend eighth amendment rights
to school children.
CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT
The majority holding on the eighth amendment issue was
based on the premise that the Supreme Court had applied the
cruel and unusual punishment clause only in cases dealing with
criminal punishments, and since an extension to noncriminal
cases was unnecessary and would serve no useful purpose, the
court's policy would not change."0 Relying on this criminal/civil
distinction, the Court attempted to fit the body of eighth
amendment law into this analysis.
The opinion cited several previous decisions in support of
the claim that the cruel and unusual punishment clause ap-
plies only in criminal cases. Capital punishment cases2' and
cases dealing with long prison terms2 predominate in these
decisions. As further authority, the Court cited such cases as
17. Baker v. Owen, 423 U.S. 907 (1975).
18. California forbids corporal punishment without parental approval. CAL. EDuc.
CODE § 49001 (West 1976). In the present case, Mr. Andrews, father of plaintiff Roosev-
elt Andrews, demanded that the principal discontinue the use of corporal punishment
after Roosevelt received a particularly severe beating. Roosevelt was not thereafter
exempt from corporal punishment. Brief for Petitioners at 13.
19. James Ingraham, who was held by Mr. Barnes and Mr. Deliford while Mr.
Wright administered 20 "licks," might dispute the Court's openness argument. James
required medical attention for severe bruises and a hematoma, and missed 11 days of
school as a result of the beating. 498 F.2d at 256.
20. 97 S. Ct. at 1411-12. The Ingraham opinion includes a lengthy discussion of the
origins and evolution of the eighth amendment. For an exhaustive discussion, see
Granocci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted:" The Original Meaning 57
CALIF. L. REv. 839 (1969).
21. The latest round of capital punishment cases, beginning with Furman v. Geor-
gia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), and continuing with the consideration of state statutes on a
state by state basis by the Court are, of course, prime objects of eighth amendment
scrutiny. See Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina,
428 U.S. 280 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Profitt v. Florida, 428 U.S.
242 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
22. See, e.g., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910), in which the Court
reversed a prison term of 12 years for falsifying public documents in the Philippines.
The punishment was found to be cruel and unusual.
[Vol. 61:199
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Robinson v. California,3 in which the Court found unconstitu-
tional a California statute which declared that narcotics addic-
tion was a criminal offense. Of course, the fact that many crim-
inal punishment cases have been decided on eighth amend-
ment grounds could hardly sustain the argument made for ex-
cluding other kinds of punishment from eighth amendment
protection.
Curiously the Court relied on Trop v. Dulles24 and Estelle
v. Gamble?' in support of the thesis that eighth amendment
protection would be afforded only in criminal punishment
cases. However, the reliance was faulty for the Estelle decision,
in fact, was not based on the eighth amendment as it affects
criminal punishments .2 The plaintiff in Estelle alleged that he
was denied adequate medical treatment while in prison, and
the Supreme Court held that deliberate denial of medical care
to prison inmates was impermissible under the cruel and unu-
sual punishment clause.2 The clause was involved not because
a refusal to provide medical care was punishment for a crime,
but because such refusal was cruel and unusual.?
In Trop, the Court held that denationalization for desertion
was barred as a cruel and unusual punishment by the eighth
amendment. 9 The government's argument in this case was
that the statute dealing with denationalization for desertion
was a nonpenal exercise of the war power by Congress and
therefore not covered by the cruel and unusual punishment
clause. The Court rejected this argument, finding that the label
placed on a statute would not determine its nature. Rather, the
23. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
24. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
25. 429 U.S. 97 (1976), rehearing denied, 429 U.S. 1066 (1977).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 104-05. In Gamble's case, the Court found no deliberate indifference to
plaintiff's medical needs.
28. Id.
In the dissenting opinion in Ingraham, Justice White states:
Yet the constitutional prohibition is against cruel and unusual punishments;
nowhere is that prohibition limited or modified by the language of the Constitu-
tion. Certainly the fact that the Framers did not choose to insert the word
"criminal" into the language of the Eighth Amendment is strong evidence that
the Amendment was designed to prohibit all inhumane or barbaric punish-
ments, no matter what the nature of the offense for which the punishment is
imposed.
97 S. Ct. at 1420.
29. 356 U.S. at 101.
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Court held that a purposive approach should be used: "In de-
ciding whether or not a law is penal, this Court has generally
based its determination upon the purpose of the statute. If the
statute imposes a disability for the purposes of punishment -
that is, to reprimand the wrongdoer, to deter others, etc.,-it
has been considered penal." 0 The opinion stated that the pur-
pose of the statute in question was clearly penal since the in-
tent was to impose a deprivation of liberty, and therefore the
eighth amendment applied.31
This finding distinguishes Trop from other deportation
cases in which the Court allowed aliens to be deported as a
valid exercise of state power. For example, in Mahler v. Eby3
the Court stated that "[t]he sovereign power to expel aliens
is political and is vested in the political departments of the
Government."' And, "The right to expel aliens is a sovereign
power necessary to the safety of the country and only limited
by treaty obligations in respect thereto entered into with other
governments."34 In these cases the Court does not refuse to
apply eighth amendment guarantees to noncriminal punish-
30. Id. at 96 (footnotes omitted). See also Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136, 1139
(8th Cir. 1973), in which the court states, "At the outset we note that the mere
characterization of an act as 'treatment' does not insulate it from eighth amendment
scrutiny."
31. In Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963), the Supreme Court
again used the purposive approach, scorned by the majority in Ingraham as without
basis, in determining whether a statute was penal and therefore covered by the eighth
amendment:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it
has historically been regarded as a punishment, whether it comes into play only
on a finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims
of punishment - retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it
applies is already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may
rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in
relation to the alternative purpose assigned are all relevant to the inquiry.
Id. at 168-69 (footnotes omitted). If, weighing these criteria, the statute can be said to
be punitive, then the eighth amendment should be applied, according to the Court.
32. 264 U.S. 32 (1924).
33. Id. at 40.
34. Id. at 39. See also Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585 (1913), on which the
majority relies. In Bugajewitz the Court finds that the reason for deportation is the
harm done to the country by the presence of the alien. The Court stated, "nor is the
deportation a punishment; it is simply a refusal by the Government to harbor persons
whom it does not want." Id. at 591. The majority in Ingraham insisted that the
distinction in this and other cases is between criminal and noncriminal punishments.
A fair reading of the cases suggests that the real distinction is between penal and
nonpenal statutes. In this context, it can hardly be argued that beating a child with a
paddle is not penal.
[Vol. 61:199
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ments as the majority suggested; rather, it finds that not pun-
ishment, but the exercise of a valid state power is involved. The
distinction is clear.
The Ingraham case is likewise distinguishable from Uphaus
v. Wyman,35 cited in the majority opinion as further evidence
of a noncriminal case in which the cruel and unusual punish-
ment clause was held inapplicable. In Uphaus, the Supreme
Court upheld a civil contempt finding pursuant to a New
Hampshire statute, imposed when a camp owner refused to
produce records subpoenaed for a "subversives" check. The
camp owner was jailed for an indefinite period, pending the
release of the records.
In holding that no eighth amendment rights were denied in
Uphaus, the Court enlarged on the penal/nonpenal distinction
by finding that a legitimate state interest in compelling the
production of documents, rather than punishment, was the
reason for the contempt ruling. Thus, the confinement was
justified in a civil setting and was not penal." Therefore, con-
trary to the majority conclusion, while there is no clear preced-
ent for applying the eighth amendment to corporal punishment
in public schools, neither is there precedent for its nonapplica-
tion.37 In fact, since the purposes of the Florida corporal pun-
ishment statute are clearly penal,3 8 the Court's decision in
Ingraham seems to reject the logic used in Trop to extend
eighth amendment protections to non-criminal, but neverthe-
less penal deprivations.
Not only is the Court's failure to apply the cruel and unu-
sual punishment clause to civil cases unnecessary in light of
previous decisions, but in this fact situation it also is contrary
to the recent judicial tendency to expand constitutional protec-
35. 360 U.S. 72 (1959).
36. Id.
37. Lower court decisions on this point have not been in agreement. In Gonyaw v.
Gray, 361 F. Supp. 366 (D. Vt. 1973), the cruel and unusual punishments clause was
found not to apply to statutorily authorized corporal punishment. The court claimed
that the clause applied only to criminal cases. But see Ware v. Estes, 328 F. Supp.
657 (N.D. Tex. 1971). While the court did find that the clause did not apply to the
statute and punishment then at issue, it did not suggest that the clause would not
apply in the proper case.
In Sims v. Waln, 536 F.2d 686 (6th Cir. 1976), Ingraham v. Wright, 525 F.2d 909
(5th Cir. 1976)- is used as precedent to support the Sims' court's rejection of the cruel
and unusual punishments argument as applied to public schools.
38. See note 8, supra.
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tions in juvenile cases.
In a footnote to the Ingraham decision, 9 Justice Powell dis-
posed of a series of opinions, having their real beginnings with
In re Gault, 4" in which many courts recognized the rights of
children faced with prosecution in the juvenile court system to
full constitutional protections.
In Gault,4' a juvenile charged with making an obscene
phone call, which Justice Fortas, writing for the majority, char-
acterized as "the irritatingly offensive, adolescent, sex vari-
ety,' '42 was sent to a juvenile home for six years. Noting that
the penalty for adults convicted of the same offense was two
months and that Gault was not afforded even the rudiments of
due process,43 the Supreme Court reversed the Arizona Su-
preme Court decision which had upheld the juvenile court rul-
ing.44
Gault was a far-reaching decision; the majority opinion
touched on many aspects of the handling of children in juvenile
court. Essentially, Gault stood for the principle that constitu-
tional protections may not be withheld from people merely
because they have not yet reached maturity. Justice Fortas
found, for example, that "[t]he essential difference between
Gerald's case and a normal criminal case is that safeguards
available to adults were discarded in Gerald's case. The sum-
mary procedure as well as the long commitment was possible
because Gerald was 15 years of age instead of over 18.
When the majority dismissed Gault in a footnote, it also
39. 97 S. Ct. at 1411 n.37.
40. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
41. While Gault was decided on due process grounds, the sweeping language used
in the majority opinion demonstrates the clear intent of the court to protect juveniles
against the full range of invasions of their constitutional rights.
42. 387 U.S. at 4.
43. See Brief for Appellants at 9-13, In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) for a complete
explanation of the procedures in the Arizona Juvenile Court. For example, Gault
received no notice, had no opportunity to confront his accuser (in fact, a probation
officer spoke with the alleged recipient of the call once; she made no further state-
ments), and there was no appeal procedure.
44. 387 U.S. at 59. The case reached the Arizona Supreme Court on a writ of habeas
corpus, since juvenile cases were not appealable in Arizona at that time.
45. Id. at 29. There is obvious irony if Gault and Ingraham are compared. As noted
previously, a student at Drew Junior High School received fifty "licks" for allegedly
making an obscene phone call which he denied making. In Gault, the same offense,
with the same protestations of innocence, brought a six year sentence. Surely, then,




held that a group of cases decided in district and circuit courts
dealing with the cruel and unusual punishment clause as ap-
plied to juvenile homes were not compelling authority, since
the reason for the extension of eighth amendment guarantees
to these juveniles was the prison-like setting in which they
lived; in contrast, the openness of schools meant no such pro-
tections were necessary for the plaintiffs in Ingraham.46
The fallacious character of this argument is pointed out by
Justice White in his dissent:
The mere fact that a public flogging or a public execution
would be available for all to see would not render the punish-
ment constitutional if it were otherwise impermissible. Simi-
larly, the majority would not suggest that a prisoner who is
placed in a minimum security prison and permitted to go
home on the weekends should be any less entitled to Eighth
Amendment protections than his counterpart in a maximum
security prison.47
In fact, Gault and other cited juvenile cases stood for the
proposition that the cruel and unusual punishment clause of
the eighth amendment would be applicable whenever punish-
ments were cruel and unusual; the decisions clearly did not say
that punishments need to be criminal for the protection to be
afforded.
In Inmates of Boys' Training School v. Affleck, the court
stated,
If a boy were confined indoors by his parents, given no educa-
tion or exercise and allowed no visitors, and his medical needs
were ignored, it is likely that the state would intervene and
remove the child for his own protection. . . . Certainly,
then, the state acting in its parens patriae capacity cannot
treat the boy in the same manner and justify having deprived
him of his liberty. Children are not chattels. 8
46. 97 S. Ct. at 1411-12.
47. Id. at 1422.
48. 346 F. Supp. 1354, 1367 (D. R.I. 1972). Two attempted suicides at the school
in question were punished by solitary confinement; no medical attention was given.
In one of the attempts in which a child slit his wrists, the blood was allowed to dry on
his body. The cruel and unusual punishment clause was invoked in this case. See also
Vann v. Scott, 467 F.2d 1235 (7th Cir. 1972); Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575
(S.D. N.Y. 1972), in which the court applied the cruel and unusual punishment clause
to a statute labeled "nonpenal" which nevertheless was invoked to place children in
detention homes with horrible conditions.
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Surely the destructive environment in a public school where
vice-principals walked the halls carrying brass knuckles is as
"insidiously destructive of the humanity of these boys"49 as is
lack of physical exercise in a training school.
Finally, in Weems v. United States, the Supreme Court, in
dealing with the permissible breadth of the cruel and unusual
punishment clause, suggested that the constitutional prohibi-
tion against cruel and unusual punishment "is not fastened to
the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion be-
comes enlightened by a humane justice."" It is indeed unfor-
tunate that, in the Ingraham decision, this suggestion was not
followed and that the human rights of students subject to cor-
poral punishment are now left unprotected.
LIBERTY INTEREST IN DUE PROCESS OF LAW
In a conclusory footnote to his eighth amendment argu-
ment, Justice Powell states,
As these cases demonstrate, the State does not acquire the
power to punish with which the Eighth Amendment is con-
cerned until after it has secured a formal adjudication of guilt
in accordance with due process of law. Where the State seeks
to impose punishment without such an adjudication, the per-
tinent constitutional guarantee is the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.5 1
Curiously, the process due turns out to be the same remedy
available when the due process clause is not involved.5 2 The
Court's argument was based on the availability of common law
safeguards and the openness of the school environment, cou-
pled with the availability of a state tort remedy if there was any
infringement of the liberty interest .5  However, two points
should be made about this argument. While the trend of deci-
Many of the children in the cited cases were in the homes due to parental neglect
and not because of any criminal or reprehensible behavior on their part.
49. 346 F. Supp. at 1365.
50. 217 U.S. 349, 378 (1910).
51. 97 S. Ct. at 1412-13 n.40.
52. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). The Court found no liberty interest in
reputation alone. Writing for the majority, Justice Rehnquist suggested that a state
tort action in defamation was the proper remedy.
53. As Justice White points out in his dissent, "under Florida law, a student pun-
ished for an act he did not commit cannot recover damages from a teacher 'proceeding
in the utmost good faith . . . on the reports and advice of others'." 97 S. Ct. at 1424
(footnote omitted). The tort remedy may well be elusive.
[Vol. 61:199
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sions in the Court's recent past supports Ingraham's due pro-
cess argument, at least insofar as the Court refused to make a
federal remedy available, 54 much precedent is ignored.55 The
refusal runs counter to a line of decisions culminating in Goss
v. Lopez,5" in which the Supreme Court found that students
suspended from public schools for fewer than ten days had a
protected property interest in education, and that minimal due
process was necessary to protect that interest. 7
In his dissent in Goss, Justice Powell argued that, "[a]s it
is difficult to think of any less consequential infringement than
suspension of a junior high school student for a single day, it
is equally difficult to perceive any principled limit to the new
reach of procedural due process."" This statement can now be
contrasted with the majority opinion in Ingraham, in which
Justice Powell states, "School authorities viewed corporal pun-
ishment as a less drastic means of discipline than suspension
or expulsion. ' 59 Logically, then, the majority should find no
protected liberty interest in Ingraham.6 0 Yet, such an interest
is found. The distinguishing factor between Goss and the series
of decisions extending constitutional due process protections to
school children on the one hand"1 and Ingraham on the other
54. See, e.g., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362
(1976); Montanye v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236 (1976); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341
(1976).
55. See, e.g., Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) where the Court said, "[it is
no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would give relief. The federal
remedy is supplementary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought
and refused before the federal one is invoked." Id. at 183. Monroe had its beginnings
in United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941), and Screws v. United States, 325 U.S.
91 (1945). In Screws, the Court states, "Nor does its [the offense's] punishment by
federal authority encroach on state authority or relieve the state from its responsibility
for punishing state offenses." Id. at 108.
56. 419 U.S. 565 (1975). See also Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969); Betts v. Board of Educ. of Chicago, 466 F.2d 629
(7th Cir. 1972); Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir. 1969);
Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280 (D. Colo. 1968); and Esteban v. Central Mo. State
College, 277 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Mo. 1967).
57. The Court defined minimal due process as "oral or written notice of the charges
against him and, if he denies them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities have
and an opportunity to present his side of the story." 419 U.S. at 581.
58. Id. at 600 (footnote omitted).
59. 97 S. Ct. at 1405. In fact the respondents claimed at the district court level that
corporal punishment was an alternative remedy, not a less serious one. 498 F.2d at 264.
60. The other dissenting justices in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), were Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist.
61. See note 55, supra.
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would seem to be the Ingraham Court's contention that exces-
sive and even brutal corporal punishment is less consequential
than a one day suspension. Surely, since corporal punishment
has been almost uniformly abolished in penal institutions
throughout the country as cruel and unusual punishment, 2 the
very least parents and students should expect is meticulous
procedural protection before the infliction of such punish-
ment.13
A post-infliction state tort remedy, the protection suggested
by the majority, in fact provides no protection. At most, a suit
for damages could be brought after the fact. The majority's
contention that this is the only process due is, in this writer's
opinion, the most alarming point made in the decision. Two
dangerous lines of argument are now opened up: First, that
state remedies should be exhausted before access to federal
courts is made available,64 and second, that state remedies may
be the only recourse notwithstanding the violation of a consti-
tutional right under color of state law.
This reasoning flows logically from recent decisions restrict-
ing relief on fourteenth amendment grounds. In Paul v. Davis,65
the Supreme Court refused to afford a federal remedy for a
claimed liberty interest in reputation.6 This decision disre-
garded the findings in Wisconsin v. Constantineau. 67 That case
62. 97 S. Ct. at 1422 (dissenting opinion). See also A. REITMAN, J. FOLLMANN & E.
LADD, CORPORAL PUNISHMENTS IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS at 9 (ACLU Reports, 1972),
wherein the authors state, "It is, therefore, startling to confront the fact that schools
are the one remaining institution in this country where corporal punishment may be
legally inflicted."
63. In Gault, Justice Fortas, for the majority, states:
Failure to observe the fundamental requirements of due process has resulted in
instances, which might have been avoided, of unfairness to individuals and
inadequate or inaccurate findings of fact and unfortunate prescriptions of rem-
edy. Due process of law is the one primary and indispensable foundation of
individual freedom. It is the basic and essential term in the social compact
which defines the rights of the individual and delimits the powers which the
state may exercise.
387 U.S. at 19-20 (footnote omitted). See also Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541,
555 (1966), where Justice Fortas stated, "But the admonition to function in a 'parental'
relationship is not an invitation to procedural arbitrariness."
64. The exhaustion doctrine is appearing with frequency in later decisions. For an
extensive discussion of this issue, see Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and
Federalism, 90 HAlv. L. REv. 1133, 1264-74 (1977). The doctrine is outside the scope
of this paper.
65. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
66. For an analysis of Paul v. Davis, see 60 MARQ. L. REv. 162 (1976).
67. 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
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involved the "posting" in all liquor stores of names of anyone
reported to be alcoholic. The persons named were prohibited
from buying alcoholic beverages. In declaring the Wisconsin
statute which authorized "posting" unconstitutional, the
Court found that "[w]here a person's good name, reputation,
honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government
is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are
essential.""
In Paul, the Constantineau decision was said not to have
extended due process protections to the liberty interest in repu-
tation; rather, it was distinguished from Paul as extending con-
stitutional protection to "the right to purchase or obtain liquor
in common with the rest of the citizenry."" This misstatement
of the clear meaning of Constantineau demonstrates the
Court's intent to sharply restrict the reach of fourteenth
amendment protections.'
In his dissent in Bishop v. Wood, Mr. Justice Brennan
called the Paul v. Davis decision, "overtly hostile to the basic
constitutional safeguards of the Due Process Clauses of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments."'" How much more hostile,
then, is the assertion that even with a liberty interest to be
protected, the protection afforded by the Supreme Court is the
availability of a post-punishment state tort remedy, which in
fact may not be available. 2
Those who feared that Paul would be extended to narrow
68. Id. at 437.
69. 424 U.S. at 708. In Paul, a man's name and picture were placed on a flyer of
"Known Shoplifters" and distributed to local merchants, despite the fact that the man
had never been convicted of shoplifting and, in fact, had been arrested only once. The
charges were dropped on that occasion.
70. Justices Brennan and Marshall in their dissenting opinion found this a ridicu-
lous reading of the Wisconsin v. Constantineau decision. 424 U.S. at 731-33.
71. 426 U.S. 341, 351 (1976). This case sharply restricts the property and liberty
interests in state employment and reputation. Justices Blackmun, White and Marshall
also dissented.
72. There is no tort remedy available against public officials in Florida unless bad
faith can be shown. 97 S. Ct. at 1424-25 n.11 (dissenting opinion). The Florida statute
states,
Except in the case of excessive force or cruel and unusual punishment, a teacher
or other member of the instructional staff, a principal or his designated repre-
sentative, or a bus driver shall not be civilly or criminally liable for any action
carried out in conformity with the state board and district school board rules
regarding the control, discipline, suspension, and expulsion of students.
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 232.275 (West 1977).
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the scope of section 1983 remedies 3 must take into account
another threat at least as serious. That is, that even with a
finding of a constitutionally protected interest, state courts still
may afford the only remedy. This is an unusual construction
of the intent of the writers of the due process clause.
In explaining the origins of section 1983 7 cases generally,
the Court in Monroe v. Pape5 found three categories in which
the statute, and consequently fourteenth amendment due pro-
cess protections, could be invoked: to override state laws;7 1 to
provide a federal remedy when state law is inadequate; and to
provide a federal remedy when the state remedy, while ade-
quate in theory, is not available in practice. As Justice White
suggests, such a remedy was probably unavailable to plaintiffs
in Ingraham." Thus, paradoxically, the constitutional remedy
made available by the Supreme Court to compensate for the
practical unavailability of state tort remedies is a state tort
remedy.
Finally, the majority draws an analogy between corporal
punishment and warrantless public arrests made with probable
cause. 8 The risk of unreasonable arrest is equated with the risk
of unwarranted and unreasonable corporal punishments. How-
ever, the liberty interest invaded when mistaken warrantless
73. See, e.g., Developments in the Law-Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV.
L. REv. 1133 (1977); 60 MARQ. L. REV. 162 (1976); E. Alexander, Due Process in the
State and Federal System (Paper #10, WCLU Foundation Civil Rights - Civil Liber-
ties - Litigation Conference, 1977).
74. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depri-
vation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceedings for redress.
This statute is derived from the Ku Klux Klan Act, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
75. 365 U.S. 167, 173-74 (1961). The opinion contains an excellent discussion of due
process rights.
76. The substantive due process issue was dealt with summarily in Ingraham. The
Court decided that the Florida statute, cited at note 8, supra, fulfilled substantive due
process requirements. 97 S. Ct. at 1415-16.
Generally, "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms
so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law." Connally
v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).
77. 97 S. Ct. at 1423-25.




arrests are made is different in kind from the interest invaded
when excessive or mistaken corporal punishment is inflicted.7 9
Once a hand is disfigured, once a head is beaten so badly as to
require surgery, or once a child is put in fear for his personal
integrity in a public junior high school, damages would seem a
pale remedy. On the other hand, a mistaken arrest can quickly
be cured, since it is merely the first step in an elaborate proce-
dure molded specifically to protect the accused's rights.
In Ingraham, constitutional protection of the basic right to
personal security and bodily integrity has been denied. The
refusal to intrude on the "educational" process " in Drew Junior
High School, even with clear evidence of the unconscionable
activities engaged in by those in authority at the school, dene-
grates the value of children's rights.
More generally, therefore, the Court's disposal of the case
on the basis that the eighth amendment's protection against
cruel and unusual punishment applies only in criminal cases
exposes a basic fallacy in the artificial criminal/civil distinc-
tion; the infliction of injury through institutional punishment
is nonetheless serious if the punishment stems from a noncri-
minal situation. Furthermore, the Court's handling of the due
process issue ignores the tenor of section 1983 decisions, partic-
ularly as they had developed over the three decades prior to the
Burger Court. It is the due process rationale which contains the
most devastating implications for those who suffer deprivation
of a protected life, liberty or property interest without adequate
notice and opportunity to be heard. The majority's fourteenth
amendment argument will have a far-reaching and devastating
effect upon the right to due process.
JOAN CLARK OLSEN
79. Id. at 1426. Justice White posits that this novel theory, if extended, would
mean the order of trial, then punishment, could be reversed; the wrongly incarcerated
citizen then could collect damages in state court.
80. See, e.g., United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976), where a warrantless
daytime arrest by postal officers was upheld as a valid use of the arrest power. The
procedures followed after such an arrest were explained in detail. As the dissent in
Ingraham makes clear, the two procedures are poles apart.
81. This refusal was the major basis not only for the Ingraham decision, but also
for the dissent in Goss. 419 U.S. at 585.
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